

BANKRUPTCY'S REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES: NET VALUE OR A "ZERO-SUM GAME"?

by

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Although federal bankruptcy law, epitomized by chapter 11, has a pro-debtor—or at least, anti-liquidation—bias, no scholarship analyzes whether that bias creates net value or merely results in a zero-sum game that redistributes value from creditors to debtors. This article shows that the bias is due more to accidents of history, path dependence, and self-interested lobbying than to any reasoned analysis of value creation. The bias also is inconsistent with many foreign insolvency laws.

The article analyzes whether bankruptcy law should have such a pro-debtor bias. An empirical analysis of that question is not generally feasible because debtor and creditor costs and benefits in bankruptcy cannot be accurately quantified and compared. The article therefore engages in a second-best methodology: it builds on the pro-debtor shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance, which is widely viewed as maximizing value, by stressing that model under the circumstances of bankruptcy. This reveals two critical differences. First, creditors become the primary residual claimants of the firm, whereas shareholders are relegated to secondary residual claimant status. That changes the identity of the beneficiary of the "shareholder" primacy model, whose goal is to favor the firm's primary residual claimants. Second, the covenants that normally protect creditors become unenforceable in bankruptcy, suggesting the need for additional creditor protection.

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Utilizing these differences, the article proposes and assesses a “creditor-primacy” governance model for debtors in bankruptcy. It also examines how such a model could be applied to maximize bankruptcy value by increasing creditor recovery without unnecessarily jeopardizing shareholder return. The article recommends, for example, a threshold viability test that would require debtors that are unlikely to successfully reorganize, and therefore likely ultimately to liquidate, to be liquidated at the outset of a chapter 11 case. That test would save the considerable expenses of proceeding through bankruptcy, which can severely reduce creditor recovery. Such a test also should reduce agency costs and moral hazard. Furthermore, it should help to avoid the sunk-cost fallacy that leads to a disproportionately high number of supposedly reorganized debtors having to subsequently refile chapter 11 cases.

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Introduction

Federal bankruptcy law, epitomized by chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, is generally said to have a pro-debtor—or at least, anti-liquidation¹—bias.² No scholarship, however, analyzes whether bankruptcy law should have such a bias.³ The evolution of federal bankruptcy law indicates that the pro-debtor bias is due more to accidents of history, path dependence, and self-interested lobbying than to any reasoned analysis of value creation.⁴ That unsystematic development invites skepticism of whether the pro-debtor bias actually creates net value or, instead, merely results in a zero-sum game that redistributes value from creditors to debtors.⁵

This article attempts to answer that question—whether the pro-debtor bias creates net value or merely results in a zero-sum game—by combining comparative law perspectives and analytical methodology. The methodology begins with the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance, which is widely viewed as creating net value. It then stresses that model under the circumstances of chapter 11 bankruptcy, taking into account differences such as the primary residual claimants of the firm becoming creditors rather than

¹ See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (“The debtor may convert a case under this chapter [7 liquidation] to a case under chapter 11 [reorganization] . . . at any time . . .”); *id.* § 706(b) (“On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter [7 liquidation] to a case under chapter 11 [reorganization] at any time.”). During a fireside chat at the Second Annual Harvard-Wharton Insolvency and Restructuring Conference (Sep. 20, 2024 at Harvard Law School) between Harvard Law Professor Mark Roe and nationally prominent bankruptcy lawyer Jamie Sprayregen, the latter stated that the federal Bankruptcy Code may be better framed as anti-liquidation than as pro-debtor.

² Elizabeth Warren, *Bankruptcy Policy*, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 780–82 (1987); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, *The Untenable Case for Chapter 11*, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1048–50 (1992). Cf. Todd J. Zywicki, *The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America*, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2032 (2003) (discussing pro-debtor bankruptcy advocacy). References in this article to a “pro-debtor” bias hereinafter will include an anti-liquidation bias unless otherwise specified.

³ See Part III, *infra* (showing that no scholars have seriously attempted to analyze whether U.S. bankruptcy law’s pro-debtor policies create net value or instead result in a zero-sum game).

⁴ DAVID SKEEL, *DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA* 23–25 (2001). See also *infra* notes 61–71 and accompanying text (discussing lobbying and path dependence as contributing to the pro-debtor bias).

⁵ Cf. Bradley & Rosenzweig, *supra* note 2, at 1048–49 (arguing that bondholders of chapter 11 debtors, as well as shareholders, lose value in bankruptcy). This article similarly assesses net value by taking into account both shareholders and creditors of chapter 11 debtors. See Part IV.D. *infra* (taking both shareholders and creditors into account).

shareholders and the reality that covenants, which normally protect creditors, are generally unenforceable in bankruptcy.

Based on the foregoing, the article proposes a new “creditor-primacy” governance model for chapter 11 debtors. It also examines how such a model could be applied to increase chapter 11’s net-value creation. In this context, among other things, the article proposes a “threshold viability test” that would require debtors that are unlikely to successfully reorganize, and therefore ultimately likely to liquidate, to be liquidated at the outset of a chapter 11 case. That test would save the considerable but wasteful expenses of proceeding through bankruptcy, which could seriously reduce creditor recovery. It also would help to avoid the sunk-cost fallacy that could drive false findings of viability at plan confirmation hearings, accounting for the all-too-many examples of post-confirmation debtors having to refile chapter 11 cases. Furthermore, a threshold viability test should help to reduce agency costs and moral hazard because a firm’s managers could not confidently take unnecessary pre-bankruptcy corporate risks to try to avoid chapter 11, assured they could fall back on chapter 11 to enable them to keep their jobs.

The article also demonstrates how a creditor-primacy governance model should improve chapter 11 debtor risk-taking. Moreover, the article proposes certain specific changes to provisions of chapter 11 that would help to facilitate the creditor-primacy model.

This article’s approach—grafting a normative analysis to improve net-value creation onto chapter 11’s otherwise widely accepted positive framework—is both pragmatic and has theoretical justification and precedent. Professor Bebchuk has used it, for example, by taking the existence of chapter 11 corporate reorganizations as a given to put forth a suggestion to improve the reorganization process.⁶

The article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the evolution of the pro-debtor bias, starting with the pro-creditor bias of medieval bankruptcy law, then progressing to reforms based on commercial expansion and economic experimentation, and finally to more modern bankruptcy laws focused on debtor rehabilitation. Part II discusses comparative law perspectives, including European Union insolvency laws that include more pro-creditor biases. Part III then examines the legal, financial, and economic scholarship. It shows that no such scholarship attempts to assess whether a

⁶ Lucian Arye Bebchuk, *A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 776–77 (1988).

pro-debtor bias creates net value or merely results in a zero-sum game that redistributes value from creditors to debtors.

Part IV of the article engages in an analysis of whether a pro-debtor bias creates net value or merely results in a zero-sum game. It acknowledges the limits of an empirical analysis: one simply cannot quantify, much less accurately compare, debtor and creditor costs and benefits in bankruptcy. Part IV then proposes a second-best analytical methodology, starting by recognizing the existence of an almost universally accepted model for balancing the interests of debtors and creditors: the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance. The analysis stresses the pro-debtor governance model under the realities of bankruptcy and tests how, if at all, that should change the model. Based thereon, Part IV then derives a normative bankruptcy-governance model, demonstrating that such a model should be more pro-creditor biased than existing law. Thereafter, Part IV pragmatically assesses the pro-creditor model, showing that it would add important positive benefits by reducing the cost of credit without undermining the fundamental benefits of a pro-debtor model.

Finally, Part V applies this pro-creditor bankruptcy-governance model to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, following the precedent of applying a normative analysis to assess positive bankruptcy law. Based thereon, Part V proposes a threshold viability test that should increase creditor recovery without unnecessarily jeopardizing shareholder return. Part V also shows how the article's normative model should apply to corporate risk-taking in bankruptcy. Additionally, Part V critiques and suggests improvements to several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in light of that model.

I. Evolution of the Pro-Debtor Bias

The evolution of the pro-debtor bias reflects a gradual historical shift from a strongly pro-creditor bias, involving debtor punishment and creditor dominance, toward debtor rehabilitation and an aversion to liquidation, sometimes at the expense of creditors.

A. Medieval Bankruptcy Law

Bankruptcy law as we know it has medieval antecedents.⁷ Medieval bankruptcy law generally was punitive to debtors, rooted in the belief that financial failure was due to a moral fault, deserving of retribution.⁸ In England, the common law allowed creditors to imprison debtors indefinitely, with debtor prisons functioning as a coercive mechanism to compel repayment.⁹ This practice prioritized creditor recovery over economic continuity or rehabilitative goals, often consigning debtors to lifelong financial ruin.¹⁰

The Statute of Bankrupts, enacted in 1542, represented the first formal codification of bankruptcy law in England. It introduced collective proceedings for liquidating a debtor's estate and distributing the proceeds among creditors.¹¹ The statute treated bankruptcy as a quasi-criminal offense, offering no discharge or relief to debtors.¹² This approach reinforced the stigma of insolvency without regard for possible harm to debtors and the broader economy.¹³

Nonetheless, despite its harshness, the Statute of Bankrupts introduced the principle of collective creditor action, laying the groundwork for more sophisticated bankruptcy systems.¹⁴ This principle recognized the inefficiencies of creditors individually pursuing remedies, which often led to inequitable recoveries and dissipation of the debtor's estate.¹⁵ The Statute of Bankrupts empowered authorities, including the Lord Chancellor and other high-ranking officials, to seize debtor assets on behalf of the creditors. The officials then liquidated the assets and distributed the proceeds to creditors on a proportional basis, embodying the *pari passu* principle.¹⁶

⁷ BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 79 (2002).

⁸ Charles J. Tabb, *The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge*, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 330–31 (1991).

⁹ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 80.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 79.

¹¹ *Id.* at 46.

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ W. J. JONES, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY: STATUTES AND COMMISSIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD 8–15 (1979).

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ Statute of Bankrupts 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (Eng.).

B. Eighteenth-Century Reforms: Commercial Expansion and Economic Rationality

The rise of trade and commerce during the 18th century exposed the inadequacies of debtor-punitive bankruptcy laws. Financial failures were increasingly seen as exogenous consequences of market forces rather than endogenous moral failings, prompting lawmakers to adopt more debtor-rehabilitative approaches.¹⁷ The Bankruptcy Act of 1705 (England) was a significant milestone, introducing discharge provisions for cooperative debtors who surrendered their assets for distribution among creditors.¹⁸ This innovation marked a shift toward recognizing the economic value of allowing debtors to reenter the productive economy rather than languishing in prison.¹⁹

The Bankruptcy Act of 1706 (England) (“1706 Act”) introduced even further innovation by allowing honest but insolvent debtors to obtain a discharge of their debts upon full disclosure of assets and compliance with procedural requirements.²⁰ This statute marked a departure from earlier punitive frameworks that treated bankruptcy primarily as a criminal offense.²¹ However, the Act maintained a strong emphasis on creditor protection by imposing rigorous standards for debtor honesty and cooperation.²²

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s 1730 insolvency statute reflected early American adaptations of English bankruptcy principles. The statute permitted insolvent debtors to obtain a discharge upon the surrender of their assets, provided they demonstrated good faith in their dealings with creditors.²³ Like the 1706 Act, Pennsylvania’s statute balanced relief for honest debtors with safeguards to protect creditor interests.²⁴

These statutory reforms were groundbreaking in introducing limited discharge provisions for cooperative debtors, reflecting a nascent recognition of economic misfortune as distinct from moral failure.²⁵ However, the

¹⁷ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 46, 47, 56.

¹⁸ Nedim Peter Vogt, *The Debtor’s Discharge from Bankruptcy: Historical Origins and Evolution*, 21 MCGILL L.J. 639 (1975).

¹⁹ Edouard Martel, *The Debtor’s Discharge from Bankruptcy*, 17 MCGILL L.J. 718, 729 (1971).

²⁰ See MANN, *supra* note 7, at 18.

²¹ See Martel, *supra* note 19, at 720.

²² MANN, *supra* note 7, at 18.

²³ *Id.* at 20; Martel, *supra* note 19, at 729.

²⁴ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 20.

²⁵ *Id.* at 18; Martel, *supra* note 19, at 729.

reforms continued to privilege creditor interests through restrictive provisions and high evidentiary burdens.²⁶ For instance, the 1706 Act required debtors to surrender all their property and prove compliance with statutory requirements, ensuring creditors retained significant leverage over debt recovery processes.²⁷ Similarly, Pennsylvania's 1730 statute permitted discharge only for debtors who could convincingly demonstrate honesty and a complete lack of fraud.²⁸ Nevertheless, they signaled a growing recognition of the need for a more balanced debtor-creditor approach to bankruptcy.²⁹

C. Early U.S. Bankruptcy Law: Experimentation and Adaptation

The United States inherited English bankruptcy law traditions. Early federal bankruptcy statutes, such as the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, of 1841, and of 1867, emphasized debtor liquidation and creditor recovery, mirroring the creditor-centric principles of their English predecessors.³⁰ These laws provided creditors with significant power to initiate bankruptcy proceedings and seize debtor assets.³¹ They offered little relief or discharge for debtors, reflecting a continuing skepticism of bankruptcy as anything other than a personal failing.³²

Public dissatisfaction with these laws ultimately led to their repeal. Critics argued that liquidation-focused frameworks failed to address the increasingly systemic economic risks posed by the sudden failure and liquidation of huge firms.³³ These risks included widespread unemployment and community destabilization.³⁴ To try to reduce these risks, states experimented with their own bankruptcy statutes, creating a fragmented, inconsistent, and unpredictable legal landscape that underscored the need for comprehensive federal bankruptcy reform.³⁵

²⁶ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 18.

²⁷ Martel, *supra* note 19, at 729.

²⁸ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 20.

²⁹ *Id.* at 79.

³⁰ Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (Apr. 4, 1800) (repealed 1803); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (Aug. 19, 1841) (repealed 1843); Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (Mar. 2, 1867) (repealed 1878).

³¹ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 223–29; Charles Tabb, *The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States*, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 10–12 (1995).

³² Tabb, *supra* note 31, at 5, 10–17.

³³ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 248; Tabb, *supra* note 31, at 15, 17.

³⁴ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 250; Tabb, *supra* note 31, at 17.

³⁵ MANN, *supra* note 7, at 255; Tabb, *supra* note 31, at 18–20. Cf. *supra* notes 23–24.

In the late 19th century, these concerns gained prominence with a series of large-scale railroad failures.³⁶ Railroads were the lifeblood of the industrializing American economy, connecting vast regions and enabling the efficient movement of goods, people, and resources.³⁷ Many railroads struggled under crushing debt loads caused by overexpansion and speculative financing.³⁸ The cessation of railroad operations threatened to undermine regional economies and paralyze industries dependent on reliable transportation.³⁹

The liquidation offered under federal bankruptcy laws was not a viable option for railroads. Dismantling and selling off railroad assets piecemeal would destroy the value of the rail network.⁴⁰ Furthermore, liquidation would complicate creditor repayment because many railroad companies were amalgamations of smaller railroads, each with its own creditor groups.⁴¹

Responding to these challenges, the use of railroad equity receiverships played a foundational role in the development of U.S. bankruptcy law. In a receivership, courts used their equitable powers to appoint, at the request of creditors, a neutral third party to manage the debtor's assets, allowing the debtor to continue operating while working to satisfy creditor claims.⁴² This approach ensured operational continuity and enabled railroads to meet public transportation needs, even in financial distress.⁴³ Paul Cravath, a prominent attorney of the era, further refined the railroad receivership by standardizing legal frameworks that prioritized both creditor protections and reorganizational efficiency, including using creditors' committees to centralize decisionmaking and implementing comprehensive plans for reorganizing the railroad's capital structure.⁴⁴

and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania's bankruptcy statute).

³⁶ SKEEL, *supra* note 4, at 61–64.

³⁷ *Id.* at 62.

³⁸ *Id.* at 63.

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 63–64.

⁴¹ *Id.* at 64.

⁴² Stephen J. Lubben, *Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory*, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1441–42 (2004).

⁴³ SKEEL, *supra* note 4, at 34–35. The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad receivership exemplified this approach, highlighting the pragmatic focus on preserving operations and financial stability. *Id.* at 36–38.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 38–39. Cravath's major contribution was helping to coordinate out-of-court creditor negotiations and using equity receivership proceedings to formalize the negotiated deals, essentially turning private workouts into court-approved reorganizations. This made

In parallel with railroad receiverships, informal out-of-court workouts also shaped early U.S. approaches to financial distress.⁴⁵ Before federal bankruptcy law offered a reliable restructuring framework, distressed businesses often negotiated directly with creditors to reach partial repayment agreements—so-called compositions—without involving the courts.⁴⁶ These arrangements were fragile, as they required unanimous creditor consent, but they reflected a commercial ethos that prioritized business continuity and cooperative adjustment over liquidation.⁴⁷ Despite their limitations, such consensual workouts played a meaningful role in preserving viable enterprises in the absence of formal reorganization law.⁴⁸

D. Bankruptcy Laws Focused on Debtor Rehabilitation

These lessons—avoiding harsh liquidations and allowing the debtor to continue operating while working to satisfy creditor claims, standardizing legal frameworks to prioritize both creditor protections and reorganizational efficiency, using creditors' committees to centralize decisionmaking, and fostering the negotiated settlement of comprehensive plans for reorganizing the debtor's capital structure—heavily influenced the drafting of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("Bankruptcy Act"), the first federal statute focused on rehabilitating business entities.⁴⁹ Drawing directly from the equity receivership model, the Bankruptcy Act introduced provisions for corporate reorganization generally with the goal of allowing debtors to restructure their indebtedness while preserving the value of their businesses.⁵⁰ The Chandler Act of 1938 reinforced this evolution by amending and supplementing the Bankruptcy Act to respond to the economic and political pressures of the Great Depression.⁵¹ As so amended and supplemented, the Bankruptcy Act created a more formal structure for corporate reorganization, further prioritizing business survival over liquidation.⁵²

the nascent reorganization system more predictable, repeatable, and legally enforceable. *Id.*

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 27–29 (noting that out-of-court workouts functioned as a widespread alternative to judicial proceedings prior to modern bankruptcy statutes).

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 28.

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ SKEEL, *supra* note 4, at 29.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 62.

⁵⁰ *Id.* at 61–63.

⁵¹ *Id.* at 57–58.

⁵² *Id.* at 59–62.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978⁵³ codified the Bankruptcy Code, including its focus on rehabilitating business entities, represented by chapter 11.⁵⁴ Chapter 11 is said to have a pro-debtor bias,⁵⁵ allowing firms to continue operating in bankruptcy while attempting to restructure their indebtedness and also significantly expanding debtor protections, introducing provisions such as the automatic stay which provides debtors with breathing room to reorganize while maintaining operational continuity.⁵⁶ Proponents of chapter 11 argue that these protections help to preserve jobs and preserve economic stability, thereby avoiding the destructive consequences of liquidation.⁵⁷

Critics of chapter 11 contend, however, that its approach is inefficient, incentivizing mismanagement and delaying necessary liquidations, often to the detriment of creditors. Critics such as Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig argue, for example, that chapter 11 creates agency costs because a firm's managers can use it to keep their jobs, even in bankruptcy.⁵⁸ They also argue that chapter 11 fosters moral hazard because it incentivizes managers to take unnecessary pre-bankruptcy corporate risks to try to avoid bankruptcy, confident they could keep their jobs if the risks fail.⁵⁹ Additionally, critics contend that the pro-debtor bias can benefit insiders—managers and equity

⁵³ Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532).

⁵⁴ DOUGLAS BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 223 (6th ed. 2014).

⁵⁵ See *supra* notes 1–2 and accompanying text. At least one commentator questions whether this bias extends to non-subchapter V small business bankruptcies. See Edward R. Morrison, *Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies*, 50 J.L. & ECON. 381, 393–95 (2007) (finding that over half of small businesses that file for chapter 11 bankruptcy are liquidated, and also suggesting that small businesses are liquidated or reorganized based on their economic realities). Morrison's article, however, was written before the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005), which introduced specific provisions streamlining the bankruptcy process for small businesses.

⁵⁶ SKEEL, *supra* note 4, at 85. Chapter 11 also increases the complexity of the reorganization process and elevates the role of legal professionals. *Id.*

⁵⁷ Elizabeth Warren, *Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World*, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 339 (1993) (arguing that the structure of chapter 11 reflects a deliberate policy choice to protect workers, suppliers, and communities by preserving jobs and local economic ecosystems through reorganization). See also SKEEL, *supra* note 4, at 35–36 (discussing the pro-debtor bias as essential for maximizing the value of distressed firms and preserving economic stability).

⁵⁸ Bradley & Rosenzweig, *supra* note 2, at 1044. But cf. Beiqi Lin, Chelsea Liu, Kelvin Jui Keng Tan & Qing Zhou, *CEO Turnover and Bankrupt Firms' Emergence*, 2020 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1, 18–20 (2020) (providing more recent data indicating that managers often do lose their jobs in a chapter 11).

⁵⁹ Bradley & Rosenzweig, *supra* note 2, at 1052.

holders—at the expense of creditors.⁶⁰

Critics also observe that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code was heavily lobbied by self-interested parties, including lawyers and other members of the bankruptcy bar.⁶¹ Although these parties argued that chapter 11's pro-debtor provisions were crafted for economic efficiency,⁶² their arguments masked the professional and financial benefits those provisions conferred on the bankruptcy bar.⁶³ For example, lawyers advocated for the automatic stay provision (§ 362), ostensibly to protect debtors and preserve the status quo during reorganizations; the real purpose, however, may have been to require creditors to initiate costly litigation to modify or lift the stay, ensuring greater demand for legal services.⁶⁴ The debtor-in-possession framework under chapter 11 was justified on the grounds of operational continuity, claiming that existing management could better guide a struggling firm through reorganization; in practice, though, it allowed debtor-side lawyers to maintain lucrative relationships with entrenched management.⁶⁵

Similarly, the debtor exclusivity period to file a plan of reorganization (§ 1121) was initially proposed as necessary to give debtors time to craft viable reorganization plans without interference from competing creditor

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 1044–45 (arguing that managers and equity holders avoid liquidation to preserve their positions and chance of receiving residual value, with creditors shouldering losses that may result from erosion of debtor's estate). *See also* Vincent S.J. Buccola, *Sponsor Control: A New Paradigm for Corporate Reorganization*, 90 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5–6, 24–27 (2023) (observing that the tendency of equity sponsors to exert control over large, distressed businesses, trying to delay liquidation, can destroy value).

⁶¹ *See* SKEEL, *supra* note 4, at 35–36 (defining the “bankruptcy bar” as “a cohesive group of bankruptcy specialists who advocated for the development and reform of bankruptcy laws, leveraging their expertise and influence to shape policy decisions, including the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978”). *Cf.* BAIRD, *supra* note 54, at 222–25 (discussing the path-dependent nature of American bankruptcy law, shaped by lobbying influences, institutional inertia, and historical contingencies); THOMAS JACKSON, *THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW* 78 (1986) (same).

⁶² Additional provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that exemplify a pro-debtor bias which may be intended to maximize debtor-side lawyering include § 706(a), which allows debtors to convert chapter 7 liquidation cases into chapter 11 reorganizations. Similarly, § 364 enables debtors to borrow during bankruptcy by giving lenders priority of repayment over the claims of pre-bankruptcy creditors. More generally, allowing debtors to retain operational control of their business during reorganization gives them significant leverage in negotiations with creditors. JACKSON, *supra* note 61, at 89–91.

⁶³ BAIRD, *supra* note 54, at 223–25.

⁶⁴ Bradley & Rosenzweig, *supra* note 2, at 1048–50.

⁶⁵ *Id.*

proposals.⁶⁶ Some suggest, however, that this provision was intended to significantly shift leverage to debtors, enabling them to delay negotiations and prolong bankruptcy proceedings at the expense of creditors.⁶⁷ Extending the timeline would give debtor-side lawyers the opportunity to increase their billable hours and overall fees.⁶⁸

Critics also could have observed that chapter 11's pro-debtor orientation has been somewhat path dependent, developing from the historical quirk that the modern formation of bankruptcy law arose in connection with preserving the railroad network, which was vital to the industrializing American economy.⁶⁹ One might argue that railroads then, like systemically important financial institutions ("SIFI's) today,⁷⁰ constitute a special case that should be protected by bespoke alternative resolution mechanisms.⁷¹

II. Comparative Law Perspectives

The foregoing transformation from pro-creditor to pro-debtor bias does not necessarily reflect the development of bankruptcy law outside of the United States. Many advanced economies have developed bankruptcy—often called “insolvency”⁷²—regimes that more evenly balance debtor and creditor interests. A comparison with those laws calls into question the legitimacy of the U.S. pro-debtor bias.

For example, Germany and the United Kingdom adopt balanced approaches that prioritize early intervention and creditor protection. Germany's recently enacted Act on the Stabilization and Restructuring

⁶⁶ See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.

⁶⁷ Bradley & Rosenzweig, *supra* note 2, at 1048–50.

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ See *supra* notes 37–52 and accompanying text.

⁷⁰ See *infra* notes 141–144 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's designation of SIFIs as a special case to be governed by bespoke resolution mechanisms rather than the Bankruptcy Code).

⁷¹ Cf. *infra* note 143 and accompanying text (referencing those alternative resolution mechanisms, intended to preserve systemic economic stability). Although banks, insurance companies, and certain other financial institutions are excluded from being debtors under the Bankruptcy Code (see 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)), that exclusion is more closely tied to other laws historically governing their resolution than to their being systemically important.

⁷² See, e.g., Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (UK); StaRUG, Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung des Sanierungs- und Insolvenzrechts [Act on the Further Development of Restructuring and Insolvency Law], Dec. 22, 2020 (Ger.).

Framework for Companies⁷³ allows for preventative restructuring measures outside formal insolvency proceedings.⁷⁴ This framework emphasizes early creditor engagement, enabling parties to address financial distress proactively while avoiding court-imposed resolutions. By shifting the focus toward negotiated solutions, it seeks to preserve value without granting debtors undue advantages.⁷⁵

Similarly, the UK's Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 introduces restructuring mechanisms that blend debtor flexibility with creditor oversight.⁷⁶ The cross-class cramdown provision⁷⁷ allows restructuring plans to bind dissenting creditor classes, but only if the plan satisfies rigorous judicial scrutiny.⁷⁸ The "no creditor worse off" test ensures that dissenting creditors receive at least as much as they would in liquidation.⁷⁹ These requirements prevent debtors from exploiting the restructuring process, while still allowing for value-maximizing reorganizations.⁸⁰ The UK Act thus illustrates a middle ground, prioritizing equitable treatment for creditors while recognizing the potential benefits of reorganization.⁸¹

⁷³ StaRUG, Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung des Sanierungs- und Insolvenzrechts [Act on the Further Development of Restructuring and Insolvency Law], Dec. 22, 2020, BGBl. I at 3256 (Ger.).

⁷⁴ Ilya Kokorin, *The Rise of "Group Solution" in Insolvency Law and Bank Resolution*, 22 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 781 (2021).

⁷⁵ Kokorin, *supra* note 74, at 791–92.

⁷⁶ Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, c. 12 (UK).

⁷⁷ The ability of courts to sanction a restructuring plan that binds dissenting creditors, if the plan is "fair and equitable," is known as "cross-class cram down." See Ali Shalchi, *Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (UK)*, House of Commons Library Research Briefing No. CBP-8971 (Apr. 6, 2022), <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8971/#:~:text=The%20permanent%20measures&The%20new%20permanent%20measures%20are,companies%20struggling%20with%20debt%20obligations>.

⁷⁸ Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act, *supra* note 76, § 901G.

⁷⁹ Although this protection is also in chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).

⁸⁰ Kokorin, *supra* note 74, at 791–92; Eidenmüller, *infra* note 106, at 240–41.

⁸¹ Jakub Kozlowski, *UK Corporate Insolvency Laws: Following the Steps of Chapter 11*, N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. Blog (Sept. 15, 2021), <https://www.nyujlb.org/single-post/uk-corporate-insolvency-laws-following-the-steps-of-chapter-11>. Although the UK Act has shifted UK insolvency law towards more of a pro-debtor bias (through mechanisms such as a standalone moratorium and its Part 26A restructuring plan), the Act includes significant creditor-friendly measures, including robust secured creditor protections, a cross-class cramdown with a "no creditor worse off" test, and priority rights for certain pre-moratorium debts. See John M. Wood, *Corporate Rescue Reanimated*, J. BUS. L. 1, 2, 6–7 (July 29,

The European Union's Restructuring Directive (Directive 2019/1023)⁸² also provides EU member states with significant flexibility to tailor insolvency restructuring frameworks based on their legal traditions and economic needs.⁸³ This flexibility underscores a core difference between the U.S. and European approaches: whereas U.S. bankruptcy law tilts heavily in favor of debtors, the EU promotes more flexibility to balance creditor and debtor interests.

III. Existing Scholarship

As next discussed, no scholars have seriously attempted to analyze whether U.S. bankruptcy law's policies, which favor debtor rehabilitation over creditor recovery, create net value or instead result in a zero-sum game that merely redistributes value from creditors to debtors.

A. Legal Scholarship

Bankruptcy scholars have long grappled with the competing priorities of liquidation and reorganization, examining such normative objectives as promoting efficiency, fairness, and economic stability.⁸⁴ The literature is largely confined, however, to describing those objectives and other relevant considerations and examining how bankruptcy might affect them. No legal scholars have analyzed whether favoring debtor rehabilitation over creditor recovery actually creates net value.

Professor Warren, for example, emphasizes that debtor rehabilitation can preserve jobs, stabilize communities, and mitigate the broader economic consequences of firm failure.⁸⁵ She frames corporate reorganization as a societal imperative, claiming that its benefits often extend beyond the immediate stakeholders to include local economies and national economic

2024).

⁸² Directive 2019/1023, 2019 O.J. (L 172) 18 (EC).

⁸³ *Id.* at 2, 15 (emphasizes that the Directive allows EU member states to adapt insolvency restructuring frameworks to align with their legal traditions and economic conditions).

⁸⁴ See, e.g., David Skeel, *Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory*, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 465, 470–471 (tracing the shift in bankruptcy theory from purely distributional concerns to a broader framework that incorporates market dynamics, institutional design, and the systemic implications of liquidation versus reorganization).

⁸⁵ Warren, *supra* note 57, at 340–45.

stability.⁸⁶ Her work, however, assumes that these benefits can outweigh the costs to creditors without providing any proof.

Professor Baird critiques bankruptcy law's emphasis on debtor rehabilitation, arguing that liquidation often can reallocate corporate resources to more productive uses.⁸⁷ He contends that by entrenching failing firms, chapter 11's pro-reorganization policies can waste valuable resources that should be redirected to more viable enterprises.⁸⁸ As with Professor Warren, however, Professor Baird's arguments are descriptive without rigorously weighing costs and benefits.

B. Financial and Economic Scholarship

Although financial and economic scholars have also contributed to the debate over the pro-debtor bias of U.S. bankruptcy law, their analyses often focus narrowly on specific policy outcomes. Professor Jackson, for instance, has studied the importance of bankruptcy law in resolving collective action problems among creditors.⁸⁹ Other financial and economic scholarship has attempted to quantify the costs associated with protracted corporate reorganizations, but fails to assess whether any benefits offset, much less exceed, those costs.⁹⁰ Similarly, the scholarship on job preservation and economic stability focuses on benefits without attempting to compare costs.⁹¹ Moreover, that scholarship tends to examine localized effects.⁹²

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 367–68. See also Warren, *supra* note 2, at 780–82 (making similar arguments).

⁸⁷ Douglas G. Baird, *Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms*, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 577–78 (1998).

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 578–79. Cf. BAIRD, *supra* note 54, at 23–25 (arguing that chapter 11's pro-reorganization policies can waste valuable resources that should be redirected to more viable enterprises).

⁸⁹ JACKSON, *supra* note 61, at 7–8. Professor Jackson is both a legal scholar and a business scholar.

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, *The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganization*, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1253–66 (2006) (comparing direct and indirect costs under chapter 7 liquidation and chapter 11 reorganization, while noting the lack of a comprehensive evaluation of chapter 11's broader benefits).

⁹¹ See, e.g., Zachary Liscow, *Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules*, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1470–74, 1480–82 (2016) (emphasizing the employment-preservation benefits of reorganization during economic downturns while not comparing the broader costs of a pro-debtor-biased bankruptcy system).

⁹² Cf. *id.* at 1480–83, 1489–90 (focusing on localized effects such as regional unemployment and industry-specific conditions, while not addressing broader systemic

Some financial and economic scholarship offers additional perspectives on the more balanced views of foreign bankruptcy regimes. For example, studies on Germany's Act on the Stabilization and Restructuring Framework for Companies⁹³ and the UK's Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act⁹⁴ highlight the economic benefits of early intervention and creditor engagement.⁹⁵ These studies, however, focus primarily on quantifying creditor recoveries without attempting to assess whether those recoveries justify the pro-creditor bias.⁹⁶ Moreover, these German and UK statutes appear to be moving to more of a pro-debtor bias,⁹⁷ so any comparison of those laws with chapter 11 is imprecise at best.

In short, the existing legal, financial, and economic scholarship fails to address whether U.S. bankruptcy law's pro-debtor bias, or even whether foreign insolvency law's occasional pro-creditor bias,⁹⁸ creates net value or instead results in a zero-sum game that merely redistributes value from creditors to debtors. This article seeks to engage that analysis.

IV. Analysis

As subpart A below shows, there is a reason why scholars have not quantified the costs and benefits of U.S. bankruptcy law's pro-debtor bias: there are practical limits to performing such an empirical analysis. This Part IV therefore attacks the problem more obliquely by analyzing how to design a bankruptcy-governance model that maximizes the expected value of corporate reorganizations. This focus accords with normative decision theory, that good social policy should maximize expected value—in this case, aggregate monetary value.⁹⁹

impacts of pro-debtor policies).

⁹³ See *supra* note 73 and accompanying text.

⁹⁴ See *supra* note 76 and accompanying text.

⁹⁵ Kokorin, *supra* note 74, at 794–96, 801–02.

⁹⁶ *Id.* at 794–96, 801–03 (examining mechanisms for creditor recovery under foreign insolvency frameworks but not addressing whether those recoveries justify the pro-creditor biases of those frameworks).

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Shalchi, *supra* note 77 (UK Parliament research briefing stating that the Act “marks a major change in UK insolvency law towards a business rescue culture more in line with U.S. insolvency (chapter 11)”).

⁹⁸ But cf. *infra* notes 102–105 (discussing recent examination of that question in Poland).

⁹⁹ See, e.g., *Decision Theory*, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/decision-theory/> (explaining that normative decision theory evaluates choices based on their tendency to maximize expected utility, often operationalized as aggregate value in public policy contexts).

The analysis proceeds by a second-best methodology. The article recognizes the existence of an almost universally accepted model, “shareholder primacy,” for generally balancing the interests of debtors and creditors. The article then stresses that model under the realities of bankruptcy. This methodology shows, at least in theory, that a pro-creditor bankruptcy-governance model should maximize the expected value of corporate reorganizations more than a pro-debtor model. The article then pragmatically assesses a pro-creditor model, showing that it should provide important positive benefits by reducing the cost of credit without undermining the fundamental benefits of a pro-debtor model.

A. Limits to an Empirical Analysis

A perfect analytical methodology would be empirical.¹⁰⁰ The problem, though, is that it is impossible generally to quantify, much less accurately to compare, debtor and creditor costs and benefits in bankruptcy.¹⁰¹ One cannot even compare the costs and benefits of debtors and creditors that go through chapter 11 bankruptcy with those of debtors and creditors that go through a more pro-creditor-biased bankruptcy proceeding: such a more pro-creditor-biased but otherwise federal-bankruptcy-comparable system simply does not exist.

The closest empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of a pro-debtor bankruptcy system comes from Poland, which in the last decade changed the pro-creditor bias of its bankruptcy proceedings to pro-debtor.¹⁰² Several finance scholars attempted to assess the impact of this change through what they identified as “the major determinants connected with the effectiveness of bankruptcy law,” including the rate of debt recovery, funds obtained by the receiver, costs of bankruptcy proceedings, and efficiency ratio measured by recovered debts divided by costs of bankruptcy proceedings.¹⁰³ They

¹⁰⁰ JACKSON, *supra* note 61, at 170–74.

¹⁰¹ But cf. *infra* notes 103–105 and accompanying text (discussing an attempt to compare the costs and benefits of a 2016 change in Polish bankruptcy law from a pro-creditor to a pro-debtor bias).

¹⁰² See *id.*

¹⁰³ Przemysław Banasik et al., *Model prodlużniczy i model prowierzycielski – porównanie skuteczności prawa upadłościowego* [The Pro-Debtor and Pro-Creditor Models: Comparison of the Effectiveness of Bankruptcy Law], 66 KWART. NAUK O PRZEDSIEBIORSTWIE [BUS. SCIS. Q.] 17, 26 (2022) (Pol.), <https://doi.org/10.33119/KNoP.2022.66.4.2>.

concluded that “the new pro-debtor model of bankruptcy proceedings implemented in Poland from 1 January 2016 is less effective than the pro-creditor model of bankruptcy proceedings was,” and that “the pro-creditor model of bankruptcy proceedings had a higher efficiency ratio than the pro-debtor model of bankruptcy proceedings now has.”¹⁰⁴ They caution, however, that their analysis has numerous limitations, and that the “research undertaken in this area should be continued and further discussed, because the presented model of insolvency is quite new.”¹⁰⁵

B. Proposing a Second-Best Analytical Methodology

This article proposes a second-best analytical methodology.¹⁰⁶ It starts by recognizing the existence of an almost universally accepted model for generally balancing the interests of debtors and creditors: the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance.¹⁰⁷ Under that model, managers are expected to govern the firm solely for the best interests of its shareholders¹⁰⁸—who stand in for the debtor.¹⁰⁹ Universal acceptance evidences a presumption that the model maximizes value.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* at 30.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* at 29.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. HORST EIDENMÜLLER, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 3–4 (2d ed. 2020) (in his comparative analysis of insolvency laws, arguing that theoretical frameworks that prioritize efficiency and value maximization are essential in the absence of empirical metrics).

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g., *Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.*, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (shareholder primacy’s classical articulation). Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *The End of History for Corporate Law*, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 443–48 (2001) (discussing the ideological convergence on the shareholder-primacy model around the world).

¹⁰⁸ Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, *Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United*, 100 CORN. L. REV. 335, 346 (2015).

¹⁰⁹ One might argue that a “pro-debtor bias,” which includes a bias against liquidation (*see supra* note 2), should mean more than a pro-shareholder bias. For example, it might also include keeping a debtor in business in order to protect employees and the local community. That expanded bias is not necessarily explicit in the Bankruptcy Code, however, because indirect stakeholders of a debtor are not considered parties in interest and have no right to appear or to be heard. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). Cf. *Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co.*, 144 S. Ct. 1414 (2024) (ruling that an insurer that has financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” because it may be directly and adversely affected by the reorganization plan). As will be discussed, this article grafts a normative net-value analysis onto bankruptcy’s otherwise existing framework. *See infra* note 111 and accompanying text.

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, *A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy*, 102 MINN. L. REV.

In subpart C below, the article stresses this governance model under the realities of bankruptcy and tests how, if at all, that should change the model. The changed model arguably would balance the interests of debtors and creditors to maximize value by increasing creditor recovery without unnecessarily jeopardizing shareholder return. This approach of grafting a normative analysis onto a widely accepted positive framework has strong precedent.¹¹¹

C. Using the Methodology to Derive a Bankruptcy-Governance Model

The realities of bankruptcy would stress the shareholder-primacy governance model in at least two ways. As next shown, these stresses remove both justifications—that shareholders are the firm’s primary residual claimants, and that creditors are protected by covenants—for favoring a firm’s shareholders over its creditors. Furthermore, these stresses cause creditors to become the debtor-firm’s *primary* residual claimants by subordinating shareholder residual claims to creditor residual claims.

1. *In bankruptcy, creditors become the firm’s primary residual claimants.* A significant justification for the shareholder-primacy governance model is that shareholders are the firm’s primary residual claimants.¹¹² This means that shareholders are primarily motivated to engage the firm in positive expected-value projects because every dollar of profit would first redound to their benefit.¹¹³ The realities of bankruptcy would reverse that

1951, 1963 (2018) (arguing that shareholder primacy operates as a Hartian obligation in corporate law, where its universal acceptance as a normative standard reflects an internalized presumption of value maximization). That presumption could be rebuttable. For example, some early societies may have widely believed that slavery created net value.

¹¹¹ Lucian Arye Bebchuk, *A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 776–77 (1988) (grafting a normative analysis onto a positive assumption, in this case taking the existence of corporate reorganizations in bankruptcy law as a given to put forth a suggestion to improve the reorganization process).

¹¹² See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, *Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Non-Shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective*, 84 CORN. L. REV. 1266, 1273 (1999) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, *Voting in Corporate Law*, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983)) (arguing that fiduciary duties should run to the party that holds the residual claim, whether shareholders or creditors, because that party bears the firm’s net risk and thus has the greatest interest in governance).

¹¹³ See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, *Corporate Governance and Risk-taking: A Statistical Approach*, 31 U. CHI. BUS. L. REV. 149, text accompanying notes 130–31 (2023) (observing

justification.

Because virtually all firms in bankruptcy are either insolvent or illiquid (or both),¹¹⁴ creditors replace shareholders as the firm's primary residual claimants.¹¹⁵ Creditor claims—to which shareholder claims are subordinated¹¹⁶—become residual claims until the debtor regains solvency and liquidity,¹¹⁷ which normally does not occur until confirmation (at or towards the end) of the bankruptcy case.¹¹⁸ Until confirmation, creditors are the parties primarily motivated to engage the firm in positive expected-value projects because every dollar of profit would first redound to their benefit.¹¹⁹

2. *In bankruptcy, creditors are no longer protected by covenants.* The other important justification for the shareholder-primacy governance model is that creditors often are contractually protected by covenants.¹²⁰ The

that “the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance encourages SIFI risk-taking that has a positive expected value to the firm and its shareholders”).

¹¹⁴ Cf. Bris et al., Welch & Zhu, *supra* note 90, at 1257–58, 1264 (analyzing corporate bankruptcies filed in Arizona and the Southern District of New York from 1995 to 2001, using a hand-coded dataset representative of chapter 7 and chapter 11 cases, and finding that most firms exhibit debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 1 or have fully dissipated their assets); SCOTT BESLEY & EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE 600 (6th ed. 2015) (observing that “the primary reason that firms fail is because they are unable to meet their working capital needs”).

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., David Skeel, *The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases*, 78 V.A. L. REV. 461, 481 (1992) (showing that for an insolvent debtor, unsecured creditors are “the firm’s true residual class”). A residual claimant simply means a claimant who is not paid until the more senior claimants are paid in full.

¹¹⁶ Shareholders always are subordinated to creditors in payment priority. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (stating the absolute priority rule of payment under which creditors are paid first (under § 726(a)(1)–(4)) before shareholders are paid (under § 726(a)(6)); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (implementing the absolute priority rule as the default distribution rule in reorganizations).

¹¹⁷ Although insolvency ordinarily explains why creditors replace shareholders as the firm’s primary residual claim, illiquidity should have that same effect. Illiquidity means that the debtor is not paying its debts as they come due; the debtor therefore will need to generate more income in order to pay those debts. See, e.g., U.C.C § 1-201(b)(23)(B) (A.L.I. & UNIF. L. COMM’N (2012)) (defining insolvency as including illiquidity, “being unable to pay debts as they become due”).

¹¹⁸ See *infra* notes 155–157 and accompanying text.

¹¹⁹ Cf. *supra* note 113 and accompanying text (comparing the shareholder-primacy model). See *infra* notes 191–196 and accompanying text.

¹²⁰ Cf. D. Gordon Smith, *The Shareholder Primacy Norm*, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 280–82 (1998) (explaining that shareholder primacy is essential because shareholders, unlike creditors who can protect their interests with covenants, lack contractual mechanisms to safeguard their investments and must instead rely on fiduciary duties to ensure their interests

realities of bankruptcy would also reverse, or at least remove, that justification.

Bankruptcy excuses firms from complying with financial covenants, such as covenants to maintain solvency or otherwise achieve a targeted financial condition.¹²¹ Firms in bankruptcy also no longer need to comply with many covenants in loan or other financing agreements.¹²² Absent covenant protection—again, this article's normative analysis starts with certain positive assumptions as to bankruptcy¹²³—a bankruptcy-governance model should treat shareholders and creditors neutrally as investors, other than regarding their status as residual claimants of the debtor.

As subparts 1 and 2 above show, bankruptcy reverses the justifications for the shareholder-primacy governance model, replacing shareholders with creditors as the primary residual claimants and the parties needing protection. In theory, therefore—and as this article later shows, in practice too¹²⁴—creditor-primacy should be the appropriate bankruptcy-governance model.

D. Articulating a Creditor-Primacy Bankruptcy Governance Model

Under a creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model, directors should manage the debtor to engage in positive expected value risk-taking that increases creditor recovery (creditors being the primary residual claimants) without unnecessarily jeopardizing shareholder return (shareholders being the secondary residual claimants).¹²⁵ In a different, but related, context in the “vicinity of insolvency” a firm's directors should “scrutinize actions that increase shareholder return by impairing creditor claims,” the “more insolvent the corporation is or would become, the more the fiduciary obligation shifts from shareholders to creditors, in a

are prioritized).

¹²¹ See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) (providing that a debtor may assume a contract notwithstanding being in default under such types of financial covenants).

¹²² See, e.g., Skeel, *supra* note 115, at 484 (observing that “the overall effect of chapter 11 is to undermine creditors' contractual safeguards considerably”).

¹²³ See *supra* note 111 and accompanying text.

¹²⁴ See *infra* notes 128–145 and accompanying text.

¹²⁵ See Frederick Tung, *The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors*, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 821–23 (2008) (arguing that in financial distress, creditors displace shareholders as the firm's residual claimants and that aligning directors' governance duties with creditor interests promotes value-preserving risk-taking while recognizing the subordinate position of equity holders).

continuum,” and in “balancing this fiduciary obligation, directors should have latitude to make their own good faith balancing of benefit and harm, recognizing that harm to creditors may well be more significant than benefit to shareholders; and therefore the benefit might have to considerably outweigh the harm, or at least provide a compelling case, to be justified.”¹²⁶ In a bankruptcy context, that balance should shift even more to creditors.

Applying that balancing to the bankruptcy context yields the following model:

1. Directors should manage the debtor to engage in positive expected value risk-taking that increases creditor recovery.¹²⁷

2. Directors should nonetheless give regard to protecting shareholders by scrutinizing actions that could increase creditor recovery by unduly impairing shareholder return. This recognizes that, if and when creditors are paid, shareholders again become the residual claimants.

3. Directors should have latitude provided by the business-judgment rule to make their own good faith balancing of benefit to creditors and harm to shareholders. Directors nonetheless should recognize that human nature tends to weigh harm more heavily than benefit. They therefore may wish to demonstrate that the expected benefit of an action should at least materially exceed the harm.

E. Pragmatically Assessing the Model

This article has theoretically derived a creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model. Theory may be inadequate, though, if using the model could be harmful in practice, such as by causing unnecessary job loss. This subpart E pragmatically assesses the model, showing that it should provide important positive benefits by reducing the cost of credit without undermining the fundamental benefits of a pro-debtor biased model.

1. *The Model should help to reduce the cost of credit.* A creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model should help to reduce the uncertainty

¹²⁶ Steven L. Schwarcz, *Rethinking A Corporation's Obligations to Creditors*, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 678 (1996).

¹²⁷ In other words, simple Kaldor-Hicks net value, which does not differentiate who benefits and who loses, would be insufficient because the primary duty should be to creditors.

created by bankruptcy law's pro-debtor bias.¹²⁸ Under that bias, pre-petition creditors cannot always expect to be able to enforce their contractual and commercial law rights.¹²⁹

Uncertainty can increase the cost and reduce the availability of credit.¹³⁰ The National Bureau of Economic Research has found, for example, that "uncertainty has a direct effect on investment" and that "greater uncertainty tends to make investment less desirable"¹³¹ and "exerts a strong negative influence on investment."¹³² Courts also have expressed concern. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has observed that uncertainty "would both impair bank financing and increase the costs of obtaining such financing."¹³³ The Seventh Circuit likewise has observed that investors influenced by the uncertainty of debt recovery might prefer not "to lend or invest in the future," causing "the cost of credit [to] rise for all."¹³⁴ Uncertainty also creates a deleterious impact on "households' access to small credit"¹³⁵ and "leads to higher loan interest rates and default

¹²⁸ Cf. Baird, *supra* note 87, at 578 (discussing the harmful uncertainty that bankruptcy law can create for pre-petition creditors); Steven L. Schwarcz, *The Inequities of Equitable Subordination*, 96 AM. BANKR. L.J. 29 (2022) (examining the uncertainty created by bankruptcy judges' pro-debtor equitable biases).

¹²⁹ Commercial law, which is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted into law in each state, is preempted by federal bankruptcy law to the extent inconsistent. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that the Constitution and federal law are the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

¹³⁰ Cf. Dan S. Schechter, *Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded Transferees of Real Property: Rethinking the Goals of the Recording System and Their Consequences*, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 125–26 (1988) (observing that creditor behavior is "necessarily influenced by the general reliability of the debt collection remedies which will be available in the event of default" and that collection risk "will be passed along to all debtors because there is no way to tell whether any individual debtor will trigger these sorts of systemic problems"); John C. McCoid, II, *Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt*, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 267–68 (1981) (observing that uncertainty whether creditors who receive a potentially preferential transfer may have to return it imposes "costs to their debtor-customers by increasing the cost of credit").

¹³¹ John V. Leahy & Toni M. Whited, *The Effect of Uncertainty on Investment: Some Stylized Facts* 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 4986, 1995).

¹³² *Id.* at 3.

¹³³ Worldwide Sugar Co. v. Royal Bank of Can., 609 F. Supp. 19, 22, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (ruling that allowing "recovery from an advising bank on the basis of a terminated letter-of-credit arrangement would" impose uncertainty and increase financing costs).

¹³⁴ *In re Lifschultz Fast Freight*, 132 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 1997).

¹³⁵ Xiang Li et al., *Policy Uncertainty and Household Credit Access: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Crowdfunding* 28 (PBC School of Fin., Mar. 2018),

probabilities.”¹³⁶

A creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model should reduce uncertainty by making it more likely that pre-petition creditors can enforce their contractual and commercial law rights.¹³⁷ That, in turn, should help to reduce the cost and possibly also increase the availability of credit.

2. The Model should not undermine the fundamental benefits of a pro-debtor bias. A creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model would reverse bankruptcy law’s pro-debtor bias. Proponents of that bias argue, however, that it helps to preserve jobs and economic stability by avoiding the liquidation of firms.¹³⁸

Admittedly, avoiding the liquidation of a firm would help, at least temporarily, to preserve the jobs associated with the firm. The problem, though, is that if the firm is not otherwise economically viable, it is likely ultimately to fail (causing a loss of those jobs).¹³⁹ Furthermore, as Professor Baird observes, avoiding, or perhaps even delaying, the liquidation of a non-viable firm could waste valuable resources that should be redirected to more viable and productive enterprises.¹⁴⁰ Reversing bankruptcy law’s pro-debtor bias therefore should not, at least in the long run, necessarily reduce jobs.

Nor should reversing bankruptcy law’s pro-debtor bias impair, much less relate to, economic stability. In response to the global financial crisis of

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3141066_code970411.pdf?abstractid=3084388&mirid=1 (on file with author) (reporting on the peer-to-peer lending market).

¹³⁶ *Id.* Cf. Diana Olick, *Here’s Why it’s Suddenly Much Harder to Get a Mortgage, or Even Refinance*, CNBC (Apr. 13, 2020), <https://cnbc.com/2020/04/13/coronavirus-why-its-suddenly-much-harder-to-get-a-mortgage-or-even-refinance.html> (reporting that economic uncertainty arising from the coronavirus pandemic made mortgage loans more expensive and difficult to get).

¹³⁷ Under a creditor-primacy model, for example, judges should be less inclined to equitably subordinate legitimate pre-petition claims. Cf. Schwarcz, *supra* note 128 (examining the abuses of “equitable” subordination). Judges also should be less inclined to ignore debtor burdens of proof (*see infra* notes 217–218 & 226 and accompanying text) and to refuse to convert non-viable chapter 11 reorganizations to chapter 7 liquidation if the debtor objects (*see infra* note 153).

¹³⁸ *See supra* note 57 and accompanying text.

¹³⁹ *See infra* note 167 and accompanying text (observing that a debtor with an inherently bad business ultimately will be likely to fail even if it is temporarily able to reduce its debt).

¹⁴⁰ *See supra* notes 87–88 and accompanying text. Cf. EIDENMÜLLER, *supra* note 106, at 4, 6–7 (arguing that maintaining non-viable businesses through overly lenient debtor protections ultimately erodes value and recommending that law should ensure timely liquidation of such firms).

2008, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act,¹⁴¹ which mandates the designation of SIFIs.¹⁴² It also exempts SIFIs from the Bankruptcy Code and provides alternative resolution mechanisms that are intended to preserve systemic economic stability.¹⁴³ This article's proposal for a creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model would not, therefore, apply to SIFIs.

This article does not purport to critique the merits of the Dodd-Frank Act's alternative resolution mechanisms for SIFIs, nor does it examine what governance models apply, or should apply, to those mechanisms.¹⁴⁴ The article merely points out that the exclusion of SIFIs from the Bankruptcy Code removes an important rationale for retaining debtor-primacy.

V. Applying the Creditor-Primacy Bankruptcy-Governance Model

This article has shown that a creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model should have both theoretical and pragmatic justification. Next, the article considers how such a model should apply in practice. To that end, subpart A introduces a new concept, a "threshold viability test," which could significantly facilitate the goals of a creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model. Subpart B examines how creditor-primacy should apply to a debtor's risk-taking in bankruptcy. Finally, subpart C examines specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that should be reconsidered in light of creditor-primacy.

A. Threshold Viability Test

This subpart's proposal for a threshold viability test could significantly facilitate the goals of a creditor-primacy model. If (as this article argues) the purpose of bankruptcy law should be to increase creditor recovery without unnecessarily jeopardizing shareholder return,¹⁴⁵ debtors that are

¹⁴¹ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010) ("Dodd-Frank Act").

¹⁴² Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398–1402 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323). *See supra* note 70 and accompanying text (defining SIFIs).

¹⁴³ Dodd-Frank Act, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454–58 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).

¹⁴⁴ This approach is consistent with the article's general approach of applying a normative analysis to certain positive law realities. *See supra* note 6 and accompanying text.

¹⁴⁵ *See supra* Part III.D. *Cf. supra* note 127 and accompanying text (arguing that directors should manage the debtor to engage in positive expected-value risk-taking that increases creditor recovery without unduly impairing shareholder return).

unlikely to successfully reorganize should be forced to liquidate at the outset of a bankruptcy case. That would save the considerable expenses of proceeding through bankruptcy, of which the direct costs alone have been estimated at “1-2 percent the value of a debtor’s assets in larger cases and 4-5 percent in smaller cases.”¹⁴⁶ In chapter 11, the debtor directly or indirectly pays virtually all of these expenses, which seriously reduces creditor and, if applicable, shareholder recovery.¹⁴⁷ Requiring such liquidation would, of course, undercut bankruptcy’s current anti-liquidation bias and jeopardize shareholder return.¹⁴⁸ Nonetheless, that requirement would be reasonable and would not unnecessarily jeopardize shareholder return¹⁴⁹ if, as above proposed, it is limited to debtors that are ultimately likely to liquidate.¹⁵⁰

Ironically, the Bankruptcy Code technically allows bankruptcy judges to convert a chapter 11 reorganization to a chapter 7 liquidation at any time during the bankruptcy case, for cause.¹⁵¹ “Cause” includes “substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.”¹⁵² In theory, therefore, this conversion option already should help to avoid the costs of a non-viable debtor continuing to operate in chapter 11. In practice, though, judges are highly reluctant to convert a chapter 11 reorganization to a chapter 7 liquidation if the debtor

¹⁴⁶ Kenneth A. Rosen, *What Does Chapter 11 Really Cost?*, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 20, 2016), <https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/what-does-chapter-11-really-cost>.

¹⁴⁷ See, e.g., Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, *Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth*, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 581, 586 (2001) (explaining that administrative expenses, such as post-liquidation costs, are prioritized and paid directly from the debtor’s estate before creditor distributions); *id.* at 588 (observing that administrative expenses frequently consume the majority of the debtor’s estate, often leaving nothing for general unsecured creditors and substantially reducing overall recoveries).

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *supra* notes 1-2 and accompanying text (observing bankruptcy law’s anti-liquidation bias).

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *supra* note 145 and accompanying text (observing that the purpose of bankruptcy law should be to increase creditor recovery without unnecessarily jeopardizing shareholder return).

¹⁵⁰ If Congress were to consider enacting a threshold viability test, they might contemplate coupling it with a weak precautionary principle, perhaps setting a slight rebuttable presumption against liquidation. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, *Beyond the Precautionary Principle*, 151 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1014 (2003) (discussing a precautionary principle under which “[r]egulation should include a margin of safety”). Any such rebuttable presumption should not be as strong as currently exists under 11 U.S.C. § 1112; see *infra* note 153 (observing that under § 1112 the party opposing liquidation must overcome the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence).

¹⁵¹ See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).

¹⁵² *Id.* at § 1112(b)(4)(A).

objects.¹⁵³

To implement a threshold viability test, bankruptcy law could require chapter 11 debtors to demonstrate at the outset of the case that they are likely—or at least, not unlikely—to successfully reorganize.¹⁵⁴ The Bankruptcy Code already has a viability (sometimes called feasibility) test as a condition precedent to plan confirmation.¹⁵⁵ However, confirmation normally occurs at or towards the end of the case, which can be extremely costly if the debtor, in retrospect, is not viable.¹⁵⁶ A threshold viability test should help to avoid these costs.

Furthermore at the time of plan confirmation,¹⁵⁷ the already invested costs can create a sunk-cost fallacy: the “tendency to continue investing in a losing proposition because of what it’s already cost us.”¹⁵⁸ This fallacy can distort findings of viability, accounting for the disproportionately high

¹⁵³ See, e.g., *In re Economy Cab & Tool Co.*, 44 B.R. 721, 724 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984) (court declined to convert a failing chapter 11 case to a liquidation, citing the speculative potential for reorganization despite mounting creditor losses); *In re Creekside Sr. Apts., L.P.*, 489 B.R. 51, 60 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2013) (observing that “The party seeking [conversion] carries the burden of proof and must satisfy that burden by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing *Loop Corp. v. U.S. Tr. (In re Loop Corp.)*, 379 F.3d 511, 517–18 (8th Cir. 2004) (in turn citing *In re Woodbrook Assocs.*, 19 F.3d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1994)); Mark G. Douglas, *Second-Guessing a Chapter 11 Debtor’s “Absolute” Right to Convert*, JONES DAY (Nov./Dec. 2006), [https://www.jonesday.com/-/media/files/publications/2006/12/second-guessing-a-chapter-11-debtors-absolute-right/files/jdnyi22948161conversion-article-for-novemberdecemb.pdf](https://www.jonesday.com/-/media/files/publications/2006/12/second-guessing-a-chapter-11-debtors-absolute-right/files/jdnyi22948161conversion-article-for-novemberdecemb/fileattachment/jdnyi22948161conversion-article-for-novemberdecemb.pdf) (“Even upon a showing of ‘cause’ to convert or dismiss, the debtor or any other party opposing the request can defeat it by demonstrating that (i) there is a reasonable likelihood that a chapter 11 plan will be timely confirmed”).

¹⁵⁴ A threshold viability test should not be needed if the debtor certifies it is filing chapter 11 to implement a liquidating plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4).

¹⁵⁵ See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (“Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor”). Cf. *In re DBSD North America, Inc.*, 419 B.R. 179, 201–04 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying the § 1129(a)(11) feasibility test and observing that “In making determinations as to feasibility, . . . a bankruptcy court does not need to know to a certainty or even a substantial probability, that the plan will succeed. All it needs to know is that the plan has a reasonable likelihood of success.”) (quoting *In re Adelphia Bus. Sols., Inc.*, 341 B.R. 415, 421–22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)).

¹⁵⁶ See *supra* note 146 and accompanying text.

¹⁵⁷ See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a), 1141(a) (discussing plan confirmation).

¹⁵⁸ Margie Warrell, *Sunk-Cost Bias: Is it Time to Call it Quits?*, FORBES (Sep. 15, 2015), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/margiewarrell/2015/09/14/sunk-cost-bias-is-it-time-to-move-on>.

number of post-confirmation debtors having to refile chapter 11 cases (jokingly often called “chapter 22s” or, in the rare example (like Continental Airlines) of filing for a third time, “chapter 33s”).¹⁵⁹ A threshold viability test also should help to avoid that fallacy.¹⁶⁰

Moreover, a threshold viability test should help to reduce agency costs and moral hazard.¹⁶¹ It should reduce agency costs because a firm’s managers cannot, as Bradley & Rosenzweig suggest,¹⁶² be confident in using chapter 11 to keep their jobs. It should reduce moral hazard because managers would be reluctant to take unnecessary corporate risks to try to avoid bankruptcy if their jobs would likely be lost at the outset of a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing that fails the threshold viability test.¹⁶³

Debtors that represent a “good company, bad balance sheet” should successfully pass a threshold viability test.¹⁶⁴ This means that the debtor has an inherently good business but too much debt.¹⁶⁵ Chapter 11 is a valuable tool to help financially troubled firms reorganize their capital structure—for

¹⁵⁹ The joke, of course, is that $11 + 11 = 22$ and $11 + 11 + 11 = 33$.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Kris Boudta et al., *Pro-Debtor Bias, Court Shopping, and Bankruptcy Outcomes*, (Ghent Univ. Dep’t Econ. Working Paper, June 2024) (arguing that pro-debtor bias is detrimental for bankruptcy outcomes because cases with more pro-debtor bias tend to have a higher refiling rate), available at https://wps-feb.ugent.be/Papers/wp_24_1088.pdf.

¹⁶¹ See *supra* notes 58–59 and accompanying text (discussing how chapter 11 can foster agency costs and moral hazard).

¹⁶² Bradley & Rosenzweig, *supra* note 2, at 1050 (“[T]he data show that chapter 11 preserves and protects the jobs of corporate managers, not corporate assets.”).

¹⁶³ *Id.* at 1057–58.

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g., Debtor-in-Possession Loan Rating Criteria, Debtor-in-Possession Loans Special Report (Fitch Investors Service Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 25, 1991, at 4 (stating that Fitch favors rating loans to debtors in bankruptcy that it deems to be a “good company, bad balance sheet”).

¹⁶⁵ See *id.* Cf. FITCH RATINGS, DIP (DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION) RATING CRITERIA 1–2 (2020), <https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/dip-debtor-in-possession-rating-criteria-30-11-2020> (describing Fitch’s methodology for assessing credit risk for DIP loans that considers the company’s projected cash flow, likelihood of emergence as a going concern, and value of assets pledged as collateral); Bruce Karsh, Pedro Urquidi & Robert O’Leary, *Global Opportunity Knocks: The Evolution of Distressed Investing*, OAKTREE (discussing “Good Company, Bad Balance Sheet”: “Distressed debt investors have traditionally bought the liabilities of companies that are in bankruptcy or otherwise appear unlikely to meet their financial obligations. The preferred target is a business with too much debt but also a strong underlying business, valuable assets, and/or the ability to generate cash. . . . These overleveraged companies often reduce their debt by going through a restructuring either within or outside of bankruptcy court”) (Nov. 12, 2021), available at <https://www.oaktreecapital.com/insights/insight-commentary/market-commentary/global-opportunity-knocks-the-evolution-of-distressed-investing>.

example, reduce their debt in exchange for issuing new equity—in order to become financially viable.¹⁶⁶ In contrast, a debtor with an inherently bad business ultimately will be likely to fail even if it is temporarily able to reduce its debt.¹⁶⁷

That raises at least two questions: (i) Who should perform the threshold viability test?; (ii) Who should assess the outcome of the test? For the first question, private for-profit valuation and investment banking firms like Houlihan Lokey may well be able to perform a viability test. These types of firms routinely assess a debtor's asset values, financial stability, and feasibility under § 1129(a)(11),¹⁶⁸ the plan confirmation viability test.¹⁶⁹ Experience shows that parties are often able to assess a debtor's viability at the outset of a chapter 11 case.¹⁷⁰ For example, rating agency Fitch

¹⁶⁶ See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, *Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization*, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1983). Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, *Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies*, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 52 (1991) (“An important goal of bankruptcy reorganization policy is to make it possible for a viable business to continue in operation so that the ‘going-concern value’ of the assets can be realized”).

¹⁶⁷ See, e.g., Michael L. Lemmon et al. “Survival of the Fittest? Financial and Economic Distress and Restructuring Outcomes in Chapter 11,” Third Singapore Int’l Conf. on Fin. 1 (Jan. 1, 2009), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1325562> (finding from a sample of large bankruptcies from 1991 to 2004 “that 79% of financially distressed firms successfully emerge from bankruptcy reorganization, while 63% of economically distressed firms either liquidate or are acquired in Chapter 11”). These results, the authors report, are “consistent with the view that the Chapter 11 process preserves the going concern value of financially distressed firms,” while “redeploying the assets of economically distressed firms” through “liquidations or acquisitions.” *Id.* Cf. Randall A. Heron, Erik Lie & Kimberly J. Rodgers, *Financial Restructuring in Fresh-Start Chapter 11 Reorganizations*, 2009 FIN. MGMT. 727, 727 (2009) (“Firms that reported positive operating income leading up to Chapter 11 emerge faster, suggesting that it is quicker to remedy strictly financial distress than economic distress.”).

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., Order Authorizing Retention and Employment of Houlihan Lokey Financial Advisors, Inc. as Valuation Expert to the Debtor, *In re Tonopah Solar Energy, LLC*, No. 20-11884 (KBO), ECF No. 155, at 2 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 20, 2020) (recognizing Houlihan Lokey’s extensive experience and expertise in financial analysis, valuation, and restructuring within chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings).

¹⁶⁹ See *supra* note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the plan-confirmation viability test).

¹⁷⁰ The threshold viability test should be performed at the outset of a case. This article does not analyze exactly when that should be. One possibility, for example, might be reasonably promptly post-petition once the debtor has begun to stabilize its operations or, if sooner, within 90 days after the filing of the bankruptcy prepetition. As a practical matter, the debtor should pay all costs (including those of third parties) of performing the test from

recommends that a lender consider providing debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing only if the lender determines, at the outset of the bankruptcy case when DIP financing is needed, that although the debtor has a bad balance sheet, it has an inherently good business—in other words, the “good company, bad balance sheet.”¹⁷¹

One might ask why markets themselves do not effectively provide a threshold viability test. After all, according to the Fitch criteria, a bad-company, bad-balance-sheet debtor should not qualify for DIP financing.¹⁷² Absent post-petition financing, many debtors with limited or restricted liquid assets may be unable to meet post-petition obligations as required to continue operating in bankruptcy and would have to liquidate.¹⁷³ At least part of the answer is that lenders do not always hew to the good-company, bad-balance-sheet DIP-lending ideal. The Bankruptcy Code offers lenders high degrees of repayment priority, including superpriority claims and liens, to induce them to extend DIP financing.¹⁷⁴ The Bankruptcy Code also assures DIP lenders, if acting in good faith, that these superpriority claims and liens cannot be compromised.¹⁷⁵ DIP lenders thus have strong repayment protection, even if the debtor ultimately liquidates. Furthermore, a bad-company, bad-balance-sheet debtor may well be able to obtain DIP financing if it pays a high enough interest rate to offset the liquidation risk.¹⁷⁶

the estate.

¹⁷¹ See *supra* note 165 and accompanying text.

¹⁷² See *id.*

¹⁷³ See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, *Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11*, 1 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 511, 515 (2009) (discussing prior literature that indicates that “relative to debtors without DIP financing, those with financing had faster cases and were more likely to reorganize or merge with another firm than undergo piecemeal liquidation”); B. Espen Eckbo, Kai Li & Wei Wang, *Loans to Chapter 11 Firms: Contract Design, Repayment Risk, and Pricing*, 66 J. L. & ECON. 465, 468 (2023) (“[A] DIP loan in many cases is needed to prevent a more costly liquidation outcome . . .”).

¹⁷⁴ See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1) & (c)(2).

¹⁷⁵ See 11 U.S.C. § 364(e).

¹⁷⁶ Cf. B. Espen Eckbo, Kai Li & Wei Wang, *Loans to Chapter 11 Firms: Contract Design, Repayment Risk, and Pricing*, ECGI Fin. Working Paper No. 848/2022, at 18, 28 (2023) (observing that DIP lenders can offset risk through high interest rates, often enabling financially distressed debtors with weak asset bases to obtain financing); *An Overview of Debtor-in-Possession Financing*, Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP (2019), <https://www.friedfrank.com/uploads/siteFiles/Publications/An%20Overview%20of%20Debt%20in%20Possession%20Financing.pdf> (describing examples of DIP loans provided to financially distressed companies, including Remnant Oil and Generation Next Franchise, which secured financing at interest rates as high as 20%, and retail companies obtaining rates from 5% over LIBOR to fixed rates of up to 12% to offset liquidation risk); David Skeel,

For the second question, who should assess the outcome of the threshold viability test, the bankruptcy judge is likely best situated and, by experience, most able to make that determination. As an alternative, the United States Trustee Program (“UST Program”—civil servants within the Attorney General’s office of the U.S. Department of Justice who are appointed to “supervise the administration” of chapter 11 cases¹⁷⁷)—could be tasked with assessing the outcome of the threshold viability test. U.S. Trustees already conduct an initial viability analysis of small businesses that are in bankruptcy under subchapter V of chapter 11 based primarily on information provided by the debtor.¹⁷⁸ Preliminary studies indicate, at least in that context, that their supervision can help to assure that only firms with viable businesses proceed with chapter 11 reorganization.¹⁷⁹ While the UST Program employs financial analysts to assist with their statutory duties, a wholesale evaluation of the viability of each chapter 11 case would likely be beyond the capacity of the program as currently constituted (even if, as under subchapter V, the viability analysis were based solely on information provided by the debtor).

The implementation of a threshold viability test, which likely would require an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, almost certainly would face political challenges.¹⁸⁰ Lawyers and other members of the bankruptcy bar¹⁸¹ might oppose it because it would reduce the number of active chapter 11 cases, and thus impact their livelihood. Strict traditionalists might oppose it if they believe that even economically non-viable debtors should be kept

Pandemic Hope for Chapter 11 Financing, 131 YALE L.J. F. 315, 327 (2021) (“Lenders might also impose a higher interest rate to offset the loss of potential DIP financing profits.”).

¹⁷⁷ 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3); *See also About the United States Trustee Program*, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Jul. 8, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program> (describing the U.S. Trustee program).

¹⁷⁸ *See* 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(7).

¹⁷⁹ *See, e.g.*, Edith S. Hotchkiss, Benjamin Charles Iverson & Xiang Zheng, *Can Small Businesses Survive Chapter 11?*, 12, 15 (Apr. 14, 2024), available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4726391> (presenting preliminary evidence that subchapter V trustees help screen out non-viable firms, thereby improving the viability profile of businesses proceeding through chapter 11).

¹⁸⁰ Indeed, even non-controversial amendments to the Bankruptcy Code tend to face political challenges. *See* David A. Skeel Jr., *The populist backlash in Chapter 11*, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 12, 2022), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-populist-backlash-in-chapter-11/> (observing that even modest or noncontroversial adjustments to Chapter 11—such as curbing insider advantages or venue privileges—have been met with significant popular and political resistance).

¹⁸¹ *Cf. supra* note 61 (discussing the bankruptcy bar and their lobbying influence).

operating in order to preserve jobs and support local communities.¹⁸² From a social policy standpoint, however, that political opposition would be unjustified to the extent it protects net *negative value* bankruptcy outcomes.¹⁸³

Another possible objection to a threshold viability test might be that it could introduce delay at the beginning of the case, which could be worrisome for cases that need a rapid resolution. In those cases, however, the parties could consider proceeding via a pre-packaged bankruptcy under § 1126(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which is designed for rapid resolution.¹⁸⁴ That approach should avoid the requirement for a viability test because it bypasses the debtor's need to operate in chapter 11. Rather, in a pre-packaged bankruptcy (or "pre-pack"), the debtor negotiates the terms of a reorganization plan with its creditors—at least with those creditors whose claims are proposed to be restructured in the plan—and then solicits their votes on the plan in accordance with applicable securities laws, before filing a bankruptcy petition.¹⁸⁵ If and when the plan receives votes that satisfy the § 1126 supermajority voting necessary to approve the plan in bankruptcy,¹⁸⁶ the debtor files its bankruptcy petition accompanied by the proposed plan and voting documentation.¹⁸⁷ Bankruptcy courts typically confirm a pre-pack plan in the first two months of the bankruptcy filing.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² See Baird, *supra* note 87, at 577–78 (arguing that bankruptcy law's emphasis on reorganization often reflects societal goals, such as job preservation and community stability, even when liquidation might more efficiently allocate resources to viable enterprises).

¹⁸³ Net negative value bankruptcy outcomes would be those that are not Kaldor-Hicks efficient (*see supra* note 127), meaning that the aggregate costs to shareholders and creditors collectively exceed their aggregate benefits.

¹⁸⁴ 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b).

¹⁸⁵ See, e.g., Aurelio Gurreea-Martinez, *The Challenges and Opportunities of Pre-Packs as a Restructuring Tool*, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 24, 2024), available at <https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2024/04/24/the-challenges-and-opportunities-of-pre-packs-as-a-restructuring-tool/>.

¹⁸⁶ See *infra* note 231 (discussing that supermajority voting).

¹⁸⁷ Gurreea-Martinez, *supra* note 185.

¹⁸⁸ See, e.g., *In re* Chaparral Energy, Inc., Case No. 20-11947 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) (confirmed in fifty-nine days); *In re* Broadvision, Inc., Case No. 20-10701 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) forty-nine days); *In re* Atlas Resource Partners, L.P., Case No. 16-12149 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (thirty-six days); *In re* FULLBEAUTY Brands Holdings Corp., Case No. 19-22185 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (four days).

B. Corporate Risk Taking

The next consideration is how the creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model would apply to a debtor's risk-taking in bankruptcy. In many cases, a chapter 11 debtor operates in bankruptcy as a going concern,¹⁸⁹ with the ultimate goal of reorganizing to become financially viable.¹⁹⁰ It therefore should consider taking business risks—not unlike a firm outside of bankruptcy—in order to gain profitability.¹⁹¹ This can create difficult choices depending on the chances of success and failure and the benefits and costs of each risk-taking engagement.

A firm outside of bankruptcy should consider engaging in a risk-taking project that has a positive expected value to its shareholders, the primary residual claimants.¹⁹² In bankruptcy, though, the debtor-firm's

¹⁸⁹ See 11 U.S.C. § 1108.

¹⁹⁰ See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, *Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?*, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 144, 147 (2005) (observing that chapter 11 aims to enable businesses to continue operations and regain financial viability by restructuring finances).

¹⁹¹ Prudent corporate governance requires managers to take business risks. Cf. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine Jr., *Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem*, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 455 (2002) (discussing management decision making about risk). A firm's residual claimants, who outside of bankruptcy are ordinarily its shareholders, benefit from the firm's profitability. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd Jr., *For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?*, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (recognizing that corporate managers, even when acting as fiduciaries, are expected to take reasonable business risks to pursue profitability and long-term success). However, "potential profit often corresponds to potential risk." *Joy v. North*, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). Creditors, like shareholders, should be able to diversify, and thereby help to control, their investment risk.

¹⁹² See, e.g., *Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.*, 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919) ("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end."). To determine expected value, one must attempt to identify each possible outcome that may result from a given decision, estimate the probability that each such outcome will occur, and then assess such outcome's likely benefit or harm. This determination "gives decision makers a way to make rational, quantifiable decisions when facing uncertain outcomes." Robert M. Lloyd, *Discounting Lost Profits in Business Litigation: What Every Lawyer and Judge Needs to Know*, 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. BUS. L.J. 9, 17 (2007). Cf. *id.* at 19 ("Expected value analysis . . . has become a foundation of business decision making."). It has "become essential to business decision making." Nicole Liguouri Micklich, Michael W. Lynch & Ingrid C. Festin, *The Continuing Evolution of Franchise Valuation: Expanding Traditional Methods*, 32 FRANCHISE L.J. 223, 227 (2013).

creditors are its primary residual claimants. Logically, therefore, as articulated in Part IV.D, a debtor-firm should consider engaging in a risk-taking project that has a positive expected value to its creditors. Nonetheless, because the debtor-firm's shareholders are also residual claimants (albeit with lower priority), fairness should require the project to either benefit or at least not impair the firm's shareholders.¹⁹³

For example, consider an insolvent chapter 11 debtor with \$100 of assets and \$150 of liabilities. The debtor is considering investing \$75 in a project that has a 60% chance of success, which would yield a \$120 return. The project's failure would lose the full \$75. The expected-value calculation would be as follows¹⁹⁴:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Expected Value (EV)} &= (0.60 \times \$120) + (0.40 \times \$-75) = \$72 - \$30 \\ &= \$42.\end{aligned}$$

This project yields a positive expected value overall. Thus, it would primarily benefit the debtor's creditors, being the primary residual claimants. Furthermore, the project either should benefit or at least not directly impair the debtor's shareholders. If the project is successful, it would benefit those shareholders because the \$120 return would make the debtor solvent.¹⁹⁵ If the project fails, it should not directly impair those shareholders because the debtor was insolvent to begin with. This analysis—that a project that yields a positive expected value overall should benefit, or at least not directly impair, the debtor's shareholders—should apply for most debtors because virtually all firms in bankruptcy are either insolvent or illiquid, or both.¹⁹⁶

That raises a question, though, whether—and if so, the extent to which—making the debtor more insolvent should be regarded as indirectly impairing shareholders.¹⁹⁷ Prior to the project, the debtor was \$50 insolvent (\$100 assets minus \$150 liabilities). If the project fails, the debtor would become \$125 insolvent (\$100 assets minus \$75 loss on the project minus \$150 liabilities). This article proposes that managers should have discretion

¹⁹³ Cf. EIDENMÜLLER, *supra* note 106, at 8–9 (contending that risk-taking in insolvency must prioritize creditor recoveries, as creditors hold the primary stake in a distressed firm's assets, while advocating for an approach that balances creditor and shareholder recoveries).

¹⁹⁴ See *supra* note 192 (describing how to calculate expected value).

¹⁹⁵ Shareholders directly benefit once the debtor reaches solvency—that is, if and when the creditor primary residual claims are paid.

¹⁹⁶ See *supra* note 114 and accompanying text.

¹⁹⁷ Correlatively, that also raises a question whether making the debtor less insolvent should be regarded as benefiting shareholders. Cf. *infra* text accompanying note 206, *infra* (observing that one could argue that shareholders indirectly benefit from every dollar that creditor claims are paid because that *pro tanto* reduces the insolvency).

to balance the benefit to creditors and potential benefit to shareholders with any such impairment of shareholders, and that managers should be protected by the business-judgment rule so long as they act in good faith.¹⁹⁸

In exercising that discretion, some managers might wish to compare the expected value of the project to the shareholders alone, taking into account any direct or indirect impairment. A positive expected value would then even more clearly justify the project. For the above example, the expected value of the project to the shareholders could be calculated as follows:

$$\text{EV to Shareholders} = (0.60^{199} \times (\$120^{200} - \$50^{201})) + (0.40^{202} \times \$-75^{203}) = \$42 - \$30 = \$12.$$

That positive expected value to the shareholders should clearly justify the project.

For another example, consider a slightly solvent chapter 11 debtor with \$100 of assets and \$95 of liabilities. The debtor is again considering investing \$75 in a project that has a 60% chance of success, which would yield a \$120 return, but the project's failure would lose the full \$75. The overall expected-value calculation would yield the same result:

$$\text{Expected Value (EV)} = (0.60 \times \$120) + (0.40 \times \$-75) = \$72 - \$30 = \$42.$$

Again, this project yields a positive expected value overall and thus would primarily benefit the debtor's creditors. However, the project's failure would

¹⁹⁸ See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (defining the business-judgment rule as a presumption that directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the company's best interests, with the burden on plaintiffs to rebut this presumption by showing a lack of good faith, gross negligence, or a conflict of interest); *In re Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co.*, 124 B.R. 169, 176 (D. Del. 1991) (explaining that once a trustee has articulated a reasonable business justification, courts will generally defer and not second-guess the trustee's judgment); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a debtor's decisions are subject to the deferential business judgment standard unless shown to be in bad faith or a gross abuse of discretion); *In re Orion Pictures Corp.*, 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing the assumption of executory contracts as a matter within the debtor's business judgment, entitled to judicial deference).

¹⁹⁹ Recall that 0.60 = chance of the project's success.

²⁰⁰ Recall that \$120 = return if the project succeeds.

²⁰¹ Recall that \$50 = the creditor primary residual claims, which must be paid before shareholders directly benefit from the project's success.

²⁰² Recall that 0.40 = chance of the project's failure.

²⁰³ Recall that \$75 = loss of assets from the project's failure, creating \$75 of further insolvency.

actually impair the debtor's shareholders because it would wipe out their \$5 residual claim (\$100 assets minus \$75 loss on the project minus \$95 liabilities = \$-70). It also could be regarded as indirectly impairing those shareholders by making the debtor \$70 insolvent. In contrast, though, the project's success would benefit those shareholders by increasing their equity value from \$5 to \$125 (\$100 assets plus \$120 return minus \$95 liabilities = \$125). As before, this article proposes that managers should have discretion to balance the benefit to creditors and potential benefit to shareholders with any direct or indirect impairment of shareholders, and that they should be protected by the business-judgment rule so long as they act in good faith.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, in exercising that discretion, some managers might wish to compare the expected value of the project to the shareholders alone, taking into account any impairment. For this example, the shareholder expected value would be calculated as follows:

$$\text{EV to Shareholders} = (0.60 \times (\$120 \text{ return} - \$0^{205})) + (0.40 \times \$-75 \text{ loss of assets}) = \$72 - \$30 = \$42.$$

That positive expected value to shareholders should justify the project.

In addition to considering possible indirect *impairment* of shareholders (by making the debtor more insolvent), managers might also consider possible indirect *benefit* of shareholders (by making the debtor less insolvent). Although shareholders do not directly benefit until the debtor gains solvency, they could be said to indirectly benefit from every dollar that creditor claims are paid because that *pro tanto* reduces the insolvency.²⁰⁶ Managers should have discretion not only to take indirect impairment but also indirect benefit into account.

Managers also should exercise discretion in assessing the impact of an expected-value calculation. For example, unless a positive expected-value project makes the debtor more of a "good company,"²⁰⁷ any profit from a project might merely improve the debtor's balance sheet, which would be

²⁰⁴ See *supra* note 198 and accompanying text.

²⁰⁵ Because the debtor is slightly solvent, no creditor primary residual claims must be paid before shareholders benefit from the project's success.

²⁰⁶ One cannot fairly compare the above expected-value calculations for shareholders of a solvent firm with expected-value calculations for shareholders of an insolvent firm. Among other things, shareholders of a solvent firm, as the firm's primary residual claimants, would benefit from every dollar of profit without limit. In contrast, creditors of an insolvent firm, as the firm's primary residual claimants, would only benefit from profits until they are paid their claims, whereupon the shareholders would benefit.

²⁰⁷ See *supra* note 165 and accompanying text (referencing a "good company" as one that has an inherently good business).

restructured anyway in a chapter 11 plan.²⁰⁸ Profit from a project should nonetheless provide more direct value to the extent it reduces the amount of DIP financing that the debtor needs to borrow. This is because the debtor must repay DIP financing as a priority obligation.²⁰⁹

The need for managers to exercise these discretions provides all the more reason why they should be protected by the business-judgment rule so long as they act in good faith in the exercise thereof.²¹⁰

C. Statutory Changes

This subpart C examines specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that should be reconsidered in light of the author's proposed creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model. This article does not, however, disagree with all provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that exemplify a pro-debtor bias.²¹¹

*Section 362.*²¹² Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code²¹³ automatically stays, or suspends, all enforcement and related actions against the debtor or its property in bankruptcy. Although the stay prevents creditors from enforcing their claims, it generally is needed to avoid so-called creditor "grab races," which not only can wastefully eviscerate the debtor's assets but also unfairly favors the first-mover enforcers.²¹⁴

²⁰⁸ Cf. *supra* notes 165–171 and accompanying text (discussing "good company, bad balance sheet").

²⁰⁹ See *supra* notes 174–175 and accompanying text.

²¹⁰ See *supra* note 198 and accompanying text.

²¹¹ Cf. *supra* notes 61–63 and accompanying text (discussing certain pro-debtor provisions, only two of which, § 362 and § 364, are reconsidered in subpart C above). This article does not, for example, disagree with § 1121, the debtor exclusivity period to file a plan of reorganization (*see supra* notes 66–68), because terminating exclusivity would allow all parties in interest to submit competing plans, making it practically difficult for a debtor's managers to consider and respond to all such plans while attempting to operate the debtor as a going concern.

²¹² Cf. JACKSON, *supra* note 61, at 7–8 (arguing that § 362 intensifies the structural imbalance between debtor and creditor rights).

²¹³ 11 U.S.C. § 362.

²¹⁴ See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, *Bankruptcy's Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm*, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1777, 1778 (2018) (observing that "earlier commentators had recognized that bankruptcy law can prevent a 'grab race' or 'race to the courthouse' by creditors of a financially troubled debtor as they attempt to collect what they are owed, and that bankruptcy can provide a less chaotic and more even-handed distribution of the debtor's assets than might otherwise be the case" and that "[a]lthough a few creditors might fare better in a grab race, creditors as a whole would suffer because the creditors'

Nonetheless, on a case-by-case basis, creditors should have the right to enforce their claims notwithstanding bankruptcy if such enforcement is neither wasteful nor unfair. Subsection (d)(2) of § 362 technically gives creditors this right: “On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay . . . if— (A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property [that is the subject of the enforcement request]; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.” In practice, however, the problem with this exception from the stay is that (at least in the author’s experience) debtors routinely respond that they will not know, until the end of the case when there is a plan of reorganization, whether the property will be “necessary to an effective reorganization.” It is rare for bankruptcy courts to grant this relief from the stay in a chapter 11,²¹⁵ especially in the early stages of a case.²¹⁶

A compromise would be for § 362(d) to clearly give debtors the burden of proof to show that the property that is the subject of the motion for relief will be “necessary to an effective reorganization.” Although § 362(g)(2) already technically imposes that burden on the debtor, it is not always applied this way in practice.²¹⁷ That tendency may well reflect the debtor bias of chapter 11 and the discretion granted bankruptcy judges by the Bankruptcy Code as courts of equity.²¹⁸ Applying a creditor-primacy model to the existing Bankruptcy Code language should make it more likely that courts would more routinely apply the § 362(g)(2) debtor’s burden of proof.

Section 364. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code²¹⁹ facilitates so-called DIP financing to a debtor in bankruptcy. It incentivizes lenders to

collection efforts could dismember an otherwise viable business”).

²¹⁵ Cf. Katharine E. Battaia & Cassandra Ann Sepanik, § 362(d)(3): *Codification of Extend and Pretend?*, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, BANKRUPTCY LAW (2011), <https://www.hklaw.com/files/tklaw/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/25130549/bloomberg article.pdf> (discussing a court’s “mistakenly substitut[ing] a § 362(d)(2) analysis for the heightened standard that Congress intended for § 362(d)(3)”).

²¹⁶ John D. Ayer, Michael Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, *An Overview of the Automatic Stay*, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10 (Dec./Jan. 2004) (observing that although “creditors often want to obtain relief quickly so as to minimize the delay and inconvenience resulting from bankruptcy,” judges “tend to be more concerned with the debtor’s rights early in the case and correspondingly less sympathetic to a [creditor’s] desire to immediately extricate itself from the bankruptcy”).

²¹⁷ Cf. *id.* (observing that although the debtor “has the burden of proof on” this issue, “[a]s a practical matter, . . . both the movant and the responding party are well-advised to be prepared to present evidence on all of the relevant issues”).

²¹⁸ See, e.g., Jonathan M. Seymour, *Against Bankruptcy Exceptionalism*, 89 U. CHI. L. REV. 1925 (2022) (arguing that bankruptcy judges should not have that equitable discretion).

²¹⁹ 11 U.S.C. § 364.

consider extending credit by giving them priority of repayment over the claims of pre-petition creditors. In general, this is a fair balance; DIP financing enables otherwise viable debtors to successfully reorganize,²²⁰ and pre-petition creditors have the right to notice and a hearing to oppose an inappropriate extension of DIP financing.²²¹

A problem can arise, though, when a debtor needs DIP financing to reorganize but lacks sufficient unencumbered assets to borrow the amount needed. In these cases, the court “may authorize the [DIP financing to be] secured by a senior . . . lien on property of the [debtor] that is subject to a [pre-petition] lien only if— (A) the [debtor] is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and (B) there is adequate protection of the” pre-petition lienholder.²²² This sounds fair, but (as next explained) ambiguity in the definition of “adequate protection” can undermine creditor protection.

Section 361(3) of the Bankruptcy Code²²³ defines adequate protection to include “the realization by [the pre-petition lienholder] of the indubitable equivalent” of its pre-petition lien. Coined by Judge Learned Hand in a different context,²²⁴ the term indubitable equivalent sometimes has been used by bankruptcy judges to provide very poor substitutes to formally satisfy the adequate protection standard.²²⁵

As with the exception to the automatic stay, § 364(d)(2) technically imposes the burden of proof on the debtor to demonstrate that the pre-petition

²²⁰ See *supra* notes 174–176 and accompanying text.

²²¹ See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(b)(d).

²²² 22 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1).

²²³ 11 U.S.C. § 361(3).

²²⁴ See *Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp.* (*In re Murel Corp.*), 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935) (referring to “indubitable equivalence” in a bankruptcy cram down context).

²²⁵ See, e.g., *In re Arnold & Baker Farms*, 85 F.3d 1415, 1419–21 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a “dirt-for-debt” plan that proposed substituting subdivided real estate for the creditor’s original secured claim, finding that proposed substitute undervalued and subject to speculative market risks, thereby failing to satisfy the “indubitable equivalent” standard and inadequately protecting the secured creditor’s interest); Cf. Lisa Hill Fenning & Michael Levin, *Philadelphia Newspapers: The Unanswered Questions for Secured Creditors*, 4 BLOOMBERG L. REP. 33 (2010) (observing that “[c]reating an opportunity to fight about indubitable equivalence inherently gives more leverage to debtors”), available at https://www.arnoldporter.com/-/media/files/perspectives/publications/2010/08/philadelphia-newspapers-the-unanswered-questions_-files/publication/fileattachment/arnoldporterllpbloombergbankruptcylawreport082010.pdf?rev=c9bd3d68241147fe92337855662a4690&sc_lang=en&hash=ECF82E6B9D0DA0D3805D791FF89DF397.

lender receives adequate protection but bankruptcy courts tend to ignore it.²²⁶ Reinterpreting bankruptcy law under a creditor-primacy model should make it more likely that courts more routinely apply the § 364(d)(2) debtor's burden of proof.

Section 363. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code²²⁷ authorizes bankruptcy judges, “after notice and a hearing,” to authorize a debtor to sell assets. Originally envisioned to authorize the occasional sale of assets and broadened in interpretation to reasonably authorize emergency asset sales,²²⁸ bankruptcy courts have used § 363 to facilitate the sale of all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets outside of a plan of reorganization.²²⁹ In ordinary circumstances, that type of sale should be effectuated as part of a formal plan of reorganization.²³⁰ Using § 363 to effectuate that sale bypasses the procedural creditor protections that are contemplated by § 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code,²³¹ which governs confirmation of a reorganization plan.²³²

The General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies demonstrate the risks of using § 363 to bypass the procedural protections of § 1129. In the Chrysler bankruptcy, the court approved a § 363 sale transferring Chrysler’s key assets to a new entity, heavily influenced by government intervention.²³³ The

²²⁶ See George G. Triantis, *A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing*, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 901–12 (noting that although the Bankruptcy Code places the burden on the debtor to prove adequate protection under § 364(d)(2), courts frequently defer to the debtor’s business judgment and approve financing motions with limited evidentiary inquiry).

²²⁷ 11 U.S.C. § 363.

²²⁸ See, e.g., *In re Dixie Pellets, LLC*, No. 09-05411, 2009 WL 8189338, *2, *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2009) (approving the sale of raw materials that are “perishable and will deteriorate rapidly if not properly monitored and maintained at significant expense”). Cf. *In re Pure Penn Petroleum Corp.*, 188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951) (discussing emergency asset sales under the predecessor statute to the Bankruptcy Code).

²²⁹ See, e.g., *In re Chrysler LLC*, 576 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing how § 363 sales are increasingly replacing sales in chapter 11 plans), *vacated as moot*, Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009); Amy R. Wolf, Scott K. Charles & Alexander B. Lees, *Recent Developments in Bankruptcy Code Section 363 Sales*, 26 REV. BANKING & FINAN. SERVS. No. 8 (Aug. 2010) (same).

²³⁰ See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (discussing the “Contents of [a] Plan” as including the “sale of all” of the debtor’s property).

²³¹ These protections include disclosure (compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(1) & (2) with 11 U.S.C. § 1125), requiring impaired creditors to receive in a reorganization plan at least as much as they would receive in a liquidation (see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)), and enabling each impaired class of creditors to veto the plan if, by supermajority vote, they disagree with it (see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)).

²³² See 11 U.S.C. § 1129.

²³³ See *In re Chrysler LLC*, No. 09-50002 (AJG), ECF No. 3073, Opinion Granting

transaction disproportionately benefited certain unsecured creditors, including labor unions, while allowing secured creditors to receive only a fraction of their claims, undermining the Bankruptcy Code's priority rules.²³⁴ In the GM bankruptcy, the § 363 sale of substantially all of GM's assets bypassed the § 1129 creditor protections. Specifically, a portion of the sales proceeds went to pay certain secured lenders and provided unions with a stake in the "new GM," while many other creditors, including bondholders and suppliers, were left in "old GM" with minimal recovery.²³⁵

To address these concerns, courts (if not Congress) should adopt more rigorous standards for evaluating § 363 sales. Some advocate, for example, a stricter "sound business purpose" test that requires detailed factual findings from courts to ensure that § 363 sales align with creditor protections and do not circumvent the priority rules established under § 1129.²³⁶ Others advocate a "rough rule of thumb" to "distinguish true § 363 sales from bogus ones that are really reorganizations that squeeze out one or more creditor layers," namely "if the new balance sheet has creditors and owners who constituted more than half of the selling company's balance sheet, but with some creditors left behind, or if a majority of the new equity was drawn from the

Debtors' Motion Seeking Authority to Sell, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets, at 1–2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2009) (approving expedited § 363 sale of substantially all of Chrysler's assets to New CarCo Acquisition LLC, despite creditor objections); Jared Ellias & George Triantis, *Government Activism in Bankruptcy*, 37 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 510, 522–30 (arguing that in the Chrysler bankruptcy, the federal government used the bankruptcy process to help the auto manufacturer resolve its financial distress while aiming to protect union workers and address climate change).

²³⁴ *In re Chrysler LLC*, 576 F.3d 108, 114–16 (2d Cir. 2009). Cf. Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, *Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM*, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1376–77 (discussing how Chrysler's § 363 sale prioritized labor unions and unsecured creditors over secured creditors in contravention of the Bankruptcy Code's priority rules); David A. Skeel Jr., *From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit*, 24 WIDENER L.J. 121, 123 (2015) (discussing the controversial precedent set by the Chrysler bankruptcy in its poor treatment of secured creditors compared to politically favored labor unions); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, *Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy*, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 770 (2010) (concluding that the Chrysler bankruptcy sale failed to comply with the "strong set of standards for a § 363 sale: the sale must have a valid business justification, the sale cannot be a sub rosa plan of reorganization, and if the sale infringes on the protections afforded creditors under Chapter 11, the court can approve it only after fashioning appropriate protective measures").

²³⁵ See *In re Gen. Motors Corp.*, 407 B.R. 463, 493–95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).

²³⁶ Jessica Uziel, *Section 363(B) Restructuring Meets the Sound Business Purpose Test with Bite*, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1210–13 (2011).

old capital structure, then the transaction should be presumed not to be a sale at all, but a reorganization.”²³⁷ Furthermore, § 363 sales should only be authorized when the debtor demonstrates a compelling business purpose and the sale does not unduly harm creditors’ statutory entitlements.²³⁸

Section 1124. Section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code²³⁹ defines what it means for a claim to be impaired.²⁴⁰ The significance is that holders of impaired claims are protected under § 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs confirmation of a reorganization plan.²⁴¹ Holders of claims that are not impaired²⁴² have no such protection.²⁴³

Debtors have used § 1124 to prejudice creditors whose contractual interest rates have declined below market interest rates.²⁴⁴ In many cases, debtors, who normally have the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization,²⁴⁵ write plans that keep those below market interest rates in place even after the debtor reorganizes and exits bankruptcy.

Section 1124(2) of the Bankruptcy Code gives chapter 11 debtors a valuable tool for use in situations where long-term prepetition debt carries a significantly lower interest rate than the rates available at the time of emergence from bankruptcy. Under this section, in a chapter 11 plan, the debtor can “cure” any defaults under the relevant agreement and “reinstate” the maturity date and other terms of the original agreement, thus enabling the debtor to “lock in” a favorable interest rate in a prepetition loan agreement upon bankruptcy emergence.²⁴⁶

²³⁷ Roe & Skeel, *supra* note 234, at 770–71.

²³⁸ Uziel, *supra* note 236, at 1212–13.

²³⁹ 11 U.S.C. § 1124.

²⁴⁰ Certain sections of the Bankruptcy Code, such as § 1124 (“Impairment of claims or interests”) and § 361 (Adequate protection”), are purely definitional. In principle, those definitions could have been included in § 101 (“Definitions”) of the Bankruptcy Code.

²⁴¹ See *supra* note 231 and accompanying text.

²⁴² In the author’s experience, these claims are often called “unimpaired.”

²⁴³ See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (applying only to “each impaired class of claims . . .”) and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(B) (excluding “each class of claims [that] is not impaired under the [reorganization] plan”).

²⁴⁴ Bruce Markell, *Fair Equivalents and Market Price: Bankruptcy Cramdown Interest Rates*, 33 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J., 91, 131 n.207 (2016) (“If a creditor with a below market rate of interest is left unimpaired under § 1124, then the value of the property received will be less than they would have received in liquidation”).

²⁴⁵ 11 U.S.C. § 1121.

²⁴⁶ *Cure and Reinstatement of Defaulted Loan Under Chapter 11 Plan Requires Payment of Default-Rate Interest*, JONES DAY (Dec. 8, 2023), <https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2023/12/cure-and-reinstatement-of-defaulted-loan->

Under a creditor-primacy bankruptcy-governance model, Congress might consider amending § 1124 to include defining a claim with a below market interest rate as being impaired.

Conclusion

This article is the first to attempt to analyze whether federal bankruptcy law's pro-debtor bias creates net value or merely results in a zero-sum game that redistributes value from creditors to debtors. Because an empirical analysis of that question is not generally feasible,²⁴⁷ the article engages in a second-best methodology, building on the pro-debtor shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance which is widely viewed as maximizing value. The article stresses that model under the circumstances of bankruptcy, revealing two critical differences: creditors become the primary residual claimants of the firm whereas shareholders are relegated to secondary residual claimant status, and the covenants that normally protect creditors become unenforceable.

The article utilizes these differences to derive a creditor-primacy governance model for debtors in bankruptcy. It then pragmatically assesses this model, showing that it would add important positive benefits by reducing the cost of credit without undermining the fundamental benefits of a pro-debtor biased model.

The article also shows how the creditor-primacy model could be applied to maximize bankruptcy value by increasing creditor recovery without unnecessarily jeopardizing shareholder return. For example, a threshold viability test would require debtors that are unlikely to successfully reorganize to be liquidated at the outset of a chapter 11 case, thereby significantly increasing creditor recovery without realistically impairing debtor rehabilitation. Such a test should also reduce agency costs and moral hazard and help to avoid the sunk-cost fallacy that wastefully causes numerous supposedly reorganized debtors to have to refile bankruptcy cases.

under-chapter-11-plan-requires-payment-of-default-rate-interest.

²⁴⁷ *But cf. supra* notes 102–105 (discussing an attempt empirically to analyze the effect of a change in bankruptcy proceedings in Poland from pro-creditor to pro-debtor; and finding, subject to numerous limitations and cautions, that “the new pro-debtor model of bankruptcy proceedings implemented in Poland . . . is less effective than the pro-creditor model of bankruptcy proceedings was”).